By promising, requesting and commanding we can give ourselves and each other reasons for acting as promised, requested, and commanded. Call this our capacity to give reasons robustly. According to the triggering account, we give reasons robustly simply by manipulating the factual circumstances in a way that triggers pre-existing reasons. Here I claim that we ought to reject the triggering account. By focusing on David Enoch’s sophisticated articulation of it, I argue that it is overinclusive; it cannot adequately distinguish between (...) threats and robust reason-giving; and it cannot adequately explain why epistemic reasons cannot be robustly given. I suggest that when we give reasons robustly, we do so directly, without explanatory intermediaries. (shrink)

Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way. Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue (...) that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Darwall has argued that Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis ought to be rejected. Here I shall argue that Darwall’s criticisms are unsuccessful. First, I argue that, contrary to what Darwall suggests, the NJT does not rely on an inference from the fact that B has a reason to treat A’s directives as protected reasons to the conclusion that A’s directives are protected reasons for B. Second, I argue that Darwall’s arguments to the effect that the (...) reasons that obtain in virtue of the satisfaction of NJT cannot ground accountability are either ill-conceived or insufficient. (shrink)

Esta es la versión escrita de una entrevista realizada a Eugenio Bulygin, profesor emérito de Filosofía del Derecho (UBA), con respecto a quien toda presentación podría resultar o bien imcompleta o bien superflua. -/- Nuestra intención al realizar esta entrevista fue indagar acerca de las respuestas que dieron a esos interrogantes las personas que, en ese momento, ocuparon posiciones de toma de decisión en la Facultad de Derecho de la UBA. La elección del entrevistado, Eugenio Bulygin, no podría haber sido (...) mejor. No solo por su lucidez y por haber ocupado un puesto de suma importancia en la transición democrática, el de Decano Normalizador, sino porque, además, ha estado siempre, antes y después de la transición, estrechamente vinculado a la Facultad, de modo que provee un testimonio invaluable de sus transformaciones a lo largo de la segunda mitad del S. XX. (shrink)